Mangrove Meets Market: Novel Conservation Story from Vietnam

Mangroves in Ca Mau

My thesis research has led me to discover a fascinating story of how market forces are being harnessed to protect precious mangrove forests. Ca Mau’s Mangrove Payment for Forest Environmental Service (MPFES) scheme represents Vietnam's first privately-operated Payment for Forest Environmental Service (PFES) scheme, uniquely integrating mangrove protection with international shrimp certification. At its core, Ca Mau's model, established through Decision No.111/QĐ-UBND in 2016, created a direct link between organic shrimp farmers and aquaculture companies. Farmers, as ecosystem service providers, maintain healthy mangrove coverage while producing certified organic shrimp. Companies, as service users, pay premium prices for the shrimp and provide additional payments for forest maintenance. This arrangement bypasses traditional government-controlled trust funds, marking a significant departure from conventional PFES approaches in Vietnam.

What struck me most during my fieldwork was how smoothly this program was running – a pleasant surprise given how complex environmental payment schemes can be. The secret? It came down to three key players and their unique dynamics.

Enterprises

Many Vietnamese PFES schemes had crumbled after just 3–4 years due to funding shortages [2]. But Ca Mau's story was different. A key ingredient in Ca Mau's success story was the robust financial backing from the private sector.

"Why invest in environmental protection?" I asked a senior executive during our meeting. The answer was clear. The company saw market opportunities: achieving international standards would unlock premium markets, while environmental stewardship would enhance their brand value. This wasn't just altruism – it was smart business.

This alignment of profit and protection isn't unique to Ca Mau. Research has shown how PFES schemes can serve as platforms for companies to hit the trifecta of economic, environmental, and social goals. It's a compelling business case: companies participating in pro-poor environmental protection can reap both direct benefits (like sustained production inputs and reduced costs) and indirect rewards through enhanced brand image [3].

Forest Management Board (FMB)

The local FMB emerged as another vital player. Far from the stereotypical image of stern bureaucrats behind desks, I found these officials deeply embedded in community life. Rather than maintaining a distant presence, FMB officials actively engaged with farmers through informal gatherings, shared meals, and regular conversations. This approach fostered trust and transformed their relationship from purely administrative to genuinely collaborative. Successful conservation policies need robust local governance systems with both technical knowledge and resources [4, 5].

What I found particularly significant was how this approach transformed the traditional power dynamic. Rather than simply enforcing rules from above, the FMB was actively empowering local communities who depend on these resources for their livelihood [6–8]. As one FMB official explained to me, "Our job isn't just to protect the forest – it's to help people understand that they are the true guardians of these mangroves."

Through regular informal interactions – from impromptu technical consultations to celebrating local festivals together – the FMB had evolved from a distant authority into a trusted partner in forest conservation. This transformation, I realized, was a crucial ingredient in Ca Mau's success story.

Farmers

During my time in Ca Mau, I spent many hours with local farmers, walking along the edges of their mangrove-shrimp ponds and listening to their stories. What fascinated me was how their perspectives had shifted over time. Initially drawn to the scheme by promises of higher profits, many farmers discovered that the immediate financial rewards weren't quite the windfall they'd hoped for. Yet, surprisingly, they remained committed to the program. Access to improved farming techniques, stable market connections, and the growing understanding of mangroves' role in sustainable shrimp production have maintained their engagement.

"When we first joined, we only saw the premium prices," explained a farmer, who had been with the program for five years. "But now we understand there's more to it than just money."

This evolution in thinking wasn't just about changed attitudes – it was about reduced risks and increased security. With the enterprise handling market access and the FMB providing technical support, farmers could focus on what they did best: managing their farms sustainably. The long-term viability of the model was proving itself through these practical, day-to-day successes.

Pictures from my field trip

Trust

Throughout my fieldwork in Ca Mau, one word kept surfacing in my research notes: trust. Like an invisible thread, it wove through every successful interaction I observed between farmers, forest officials, and enterprise representatives. This trust isn't just a nice-to-have – it's fundamental to policy implementation, encouraging stakeholders to work together effectively [9, 10].

"Building trust isn't something that happens overnight," an FMB official explained to me. "It's built day by day, conversation by conversation." This insight aligned with research showing trust-building as a complex, dynamic process [11].

The FMB's approach was comprehensive – from formal training sessions and technical support to informal gatherings and shared meals. When conflicts arose, they acted as mediators, helping find solutions that worked for everyone.

The enterprise, too, played its part in building trust. Beyond their regular support, I observed numerous thoughtful gestures – from distributing rice during hard times to organizing field trips where farmers could learn from successful operations in other regions.

Through these observations, I came to understand that the success of Ca Mau's MPFES wasn't just about the formal mechanisms of payments and certifications. It was about the relationships and trust built through countless small interactions, both formal and informal, that created a foundation strong enough to support the entire program.

However, the implementation isn't without challenges. Time and again, I heard a common complaint from farmers: while the program opened new doors, farmers often felt their voices were lost in the corridors of decision-making, particularly when it came to critical choices about forest coverage and payment rates.

The payments meant to incentivize forest conservation turned out to be more symbolic than transformative – like receiving a participation certificate rather than the substantial reward many had hoped for. At the same time, farmers shared their disappointment over certified shrimp prices with remarkable candor, their expectations of premium market rates remaining largely unmet.

One of the most fascinating revelations came when discussing environmental awareness. While enterprises and forest management boards took pride in the effectiveness of their training programs, farmers taught me a different lesson. "We've always known the forest matters. What really helped was learning the 'how' – specific techniques for keeping these forests healthy while farming alongside them."

Looking to the future, Ca Mau's experiment offers both warning and wisdom. The model shows promise, but it needs stronger roots – particularly in legal frameworks that give farmers a more powerful voice in the decisions that shape their lives. Yet despite its imperfections, this innovative approach offers valuable lessons for coastal regions worldwide struggling to balance conservation with development.

The story of Ca Mau reminds us that conservation doesn't have to be a top-down mandate. Sometimes, the most effective solutions emerge when we align environmental protection with market forces and community interests, creating a symphony of sustainability that benefits both nature and people.

References: 

1. Bennett, D.E. and Gosnell, H. (2015) ‘Integrating multiple perspectives on payments for ecosystem services through a social–ecological systems framework’, Ecological Economics, 116, pp. 172–181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.04.019.

2. Nguyen, H. et al. (2022) ‘Mangrove-shrimp farming: A triple-win approach for communities in the Mekong River Delta’, Ocean & Coastal Management, 221, p. 106082. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2022.106082.

3. Thompson, B.S. (2021) ‘Corporate payments for ecosystem services in theory and practice: Links to economics, business, and sustainability’, Sustainability, 13(15), p. 8307.

4. Friess, D.A. et al. (2016) ‘Policy challenges and approaches for the conservation of mangrove forests in Southeast Asia’, Conservation Biology, 30(5), pp. 933–949. https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12784.

5. Rakotomahazo, C. et al. (2023) ‘Exploring the policy and institutional context of a Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme for mangroves in southwestern Madagascar’, Marine Policy, 148, p. 105450.

6. Locatelli, T. et al. (2014) ‘Turning the tide: how blue carbon and payments for ecosystem services (PES) might help save mangrove forests’, Ambio, 43, pp. 981–995.

7. Friess, D.A. et al. (2016) ‘Policy challenges and approaches for the conservation of mangrove forests in Southeast Asia’, Conservation Biology, 30(5), pp. 933–949. https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12784.

8. Wylie, L., Sutton-Grier, A.E. and Moore, A. (2016) ‘Keys to successful blue carbon projects: lessons learned from global case studies’, Marine Policy, 65, pp. 76–84.

9. Kumar, P., Kumar, M. and Garrett, L. (2014) ‘Behavioural foundation of response policies for ecosystem management: What can we learn from Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)’, Ecosystem Services, 10, pp. 128–136.

10. Midler, E. et al. (2015) ‘Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action’, Ecological Economics, 120, pp. 394–405.

11. Gray, S., Shwom, R. and Jordan, R. (2012) ‘Understanding Factors That Influence Stakeholder Trust of Natural Resource Science and Institutions’, Environmental Management, 49, pp. 663–674. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-011-9800-7.